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INTRODUCTION

Every firm whose profits depend upon the use of confidential
business information runs the risk of incurring serious losses if such
information were to be acquired and used without authorization by
another firm.1 In recent years, the likelihood that such losses will
occur has greatly increased due to a rise in both industrial espio
nage 2 and employee mobility. Industrial espionage, always in vogue,
1. As one commentator has noted:
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION today is so acute in many instances that very often
a few pennies in the selling price of a product or service, or its quality or lack
of it, one way or the other, spells success or failure in the sale of that product
or service. Frequently the price or quality of such product or service is de
termined by information gained through painstaking effort on the part of a
company, by its so-called "know how," by equipment refinements, by new
invention and processing methods, and by other means all of which are to a
greater or lesser degree kept from the inquisitive eye of competitors and
others not directly concerned with the operation.
Maruchnics, Industrial Trade Secrets, Their Use and Prqtection, 4 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 69, 69 (1955). See also Cranzeier, Guarding Against Industrial Espionage, 53
MANAGEMENT REV. 40, 41 (Jan. 1974) ("In the V.S. free-enterprise system, research
secrets have become the handle to industrial power, and the company that doesn't
have any secrets to protect really isn't in the business of competing."); Bender, Trade
Secret Protection of Software, 38 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 909, 912 (1970) (research
secrets are the sine qua non of market power).
2. "Industrial espionage is the practice of engaging in surreptitious surveillance
for the purpose of discovering a businessman's secrets." Comment, Industrial Espio
nage: Piracy of Secret and Technical Information, 14 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 911, 911
(1967); Perham, The Great Game of Corporate Espionage, 95-96 DUN'S REV. 30 (Oct.
1970). Although some observers have written that the industrial espionage threat is not
substantial, see, e.g., Furasch, Problems in Review-Industrial Espionage, 37 HARV.
Bus. REV. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1959), it seems quite clear that it does pose serious problems
for the business community. See, e.g., BRENTON, PRIVACY INVADERS, 139-50 (1965);
Bartenstein, Research Espionage: A Threat To Our National Security, 17 FOOD,
DRUG, COSMo L.J. 813 (1962); Industrial Spying Goes Big League, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 6,
1962, at 64; and see generally Hearings on S.928 before the Subcomm. on Administra
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the judician}, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, 551 (1967). A recent study has concluded that younger executives, as
compared with older executives, would authorize the carrying out of some highly
questionable information gathering schemes. Wall, What The Competition is Doing:
Your Need to Know, 52 HARV. Bus. REV. 22, 23 (Nov.-Dec. 1959).

1978]

TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION

3

is now easier than ever due to advanced electronic surveillance
equipment which dispenses with the need to be physically present
upon a firm's premises. 3 Paralleling the growth of industrial espio
nage is the increased frequency with which key executives and tech
nicians change jobs, taking with them confidential information that
they acquired during their previous employment. 4 These employees
often do not hesitate to pass on their former employer's confidential
information because their sense of loyalty appears to run entirely in
favor of the new employer. Loyalty to the former employer appears
to evaporate when the job comes to an end. 5 One observer has
estimated that as a result of these developments, firms now appro
priate four billion dollars worth of confidential information each year
from competing businesses. 6
The owner of valuable confidential information has traditionally
had two means of guarding such information: obtaining a patent
under the Patent Act 7 or keeping the information secret and relying
3. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 365 (1967); Comment, Corporate
Privacy: A Remedy for The Victim of Industrial Espionage, 1971 DUKE L.J. 391,
395-96. In this regard, one estimate asserted that approximately $300 million is spent
on industrial espionage devices. Hunting Industry Spies, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 1, 1966, at
64. Though dated, this estimate would clearly appear to be the minimum figure spent
in recent years, with the total greatly exceeding it.
4. See, e.g., Note, Trade Secret Protection of Non-Technical Competitive In
formation, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1164, 1166-67 (1969); Developments in the Law-Com
petitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 950 (1964). In a survey conducted by the Har
vard Business School of readers of The Harvard Business Review, 78% of those
surveyed said they would give to their new employers all of their information about
their former employer and 45% said they would hire as a new employee one who
previously worked for a competitor for the sole purpose of gaining information about
that firm. Furasch, Problems in Review-Industrial Espionage, 37 HARV. Bus. REV. 6,
164, 168 (Nov.-Dec. 1959).
5. Harding, Trade Secrets and The Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAW. 395, 396
(1967). One court has gone so far as to characterize the former employee who departs
with confidential information as the "most exasperating of all competitors." Belmont
Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 103 F.2d 538, 542 (3d Cir. 1939).
6. The increasing need for firms to remain competitive with other businesses
and keep abreast of technological developments and innovations, and the expense
thereof, are generally asserted as the reasons businesses resort to industrial espionage
rather than develop such information themselves. See, e.g., Comment, Corporate Pri
vacy: A Remedy for The Victim of Industrial Espionage, 1971 DUKE L.J. 391, 394-95;
Comment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Informa
tion, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 911, 912-13 (1967); Note, Industrial Espionage-Nebraska's
New Felony, 45 NEB. L. REV. 644, 645 (1966).
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970). The grant of a patent is the "grant of a statutory
monopoly," Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,229 (1964), which gives
the patentee the right, limited to a term of 14 or 17 years, to exclude others from the
use of his patented item for during that time no one can make, use, or sell the patented
item without the patentee's'authority. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173,271 (1970).
"
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on the common law of trade secrets which, under certain circum
stances, protects a firm's valuable business information not patented
or patentable against unauthorized commercial use by others.8
However, the availability of patent protection is limited. To obtain a
patent, one must make a threshold showing that the confidential
information is patentable subject matter. 9 After this initial require
ment is met, proof of originality,IO novelty,11 utility,12 and non
obviousness 13 must be presented. Finally, the patent applicant
must comply with a host of procedural requirements. 14 Even when a
patent can be obtained this form of protection may not make good
business sense when compared with reliance on trade secret law. In
the first place, the patent application requires full disclosure of all
the essential features of the item for which protection is sought. 15

8. R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 8.02(1) (1977); S. OPPENHEIM & C. WESTON,
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES & CONSUMER PROTECTION 317 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as OPPENHEIM & WESTON]. See generally Note, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared,
50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 536 (1968). Unlike patent protection,
[t]rade secret protection is theoretically perpetual in duration but the actual
length of protection depends upon success in keeping it secret, and it is
subject to being lost by independent discovery or other fair means of obtain
ing the secret, or because the owner otherwise cannot hold another liable for
the disclosure or use of a trade secret in numerous situations.
OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra at 318. One commentator has cited these examples of
longevity: H[F]ormulas for the mixing of ingredients for cymbals (336 years in the
Zildjian family) or aromatic bitters (Angostura-Wupperman) or Eau de Cologne ('No.
4711' made by generations of the Muelhens family in Cologne) or Smith Brother's
Black Cough Drops (said to be over 100 years old)." Klein, The Technical Trade Secret
Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 437, 438 (1960). Added to this list should
be the formula for Coca-Cola which has never been duplicated. See TIME, Aug. 22,
1977, at 44. As to the possibility of securing protection under the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970), see H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW passim (3d ed. 1952);
Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 976, 985 (1951). Suffice it to say that it is highly improbable
that confidential business information would be afforded copyright protection. Com
ment, Industrial Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Information,
14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 911, 924-25 (1967).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). Thus, for example, in In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324,
327-28 (C.C.P.A. 1942), an applicant was denied a patent on the ground that Ha system
of transacting business, apart from the means for carrying out such system, is not
within the purview of [35 U.S.C. § 101], nor is an abstract idea or theory, regardless of
its importance or the ingenuity with which it is conceived . . . patentable subject
matter."
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115 (1970).
11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1970).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
14. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS 640 (1972).
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-114 (1970). See also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards
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This requirement may be particularly damaging because the
patented matter is deemed dedicated to the public when the patent
expires. is In contrast, trade secret protection is theoretically per
petual. 17 Second, patent infringement suits are costly18 and it is
generally recognized that these suits frequently end with declaration
of patent invalidity. 19 Trade secret plaintiffs are more often success
ful. 20 Finally, the Supreme Court has held that a licensee of a patent
who successfully challenges the validity of his licensor's patent is not
liable for contract royalties, even if the subject of the patent was
secret at the time of the contracting. 21 On the other hand, the case
law seems clear in upholding the rights of a licensor of a trade secret
to the bargained for royalty despite the fact that the subject matter
of the trade secret has become public knowledge. 22 Consequently,
more and more firms are opting for trade secret law in order to
protect their confidential information. 23
Thus, it appears that more and more lawyers previously un
familiar with trade secrets will come into contact with this body of
Phannacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1971); National Theatre Supply Co. v. Da-Lite
Screen Co., 86 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1936); Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway
Corp., 357 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. III. 1973).
16. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,119-20 (1938); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
17. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 8.02(1).
18. Note, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 536, 540
(1968).
19. Approximately 72% of the patents whose validity is raised in the courts of
appeals are held invalid. [1973] PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. No. 120 at A-2 (BNA)
(remarks of Sen. Phillip Hart on introducing Patent Refonn Act of 1973). It should be
noted, however, that fewer than 1% of the patents issued each year are challenged.
Patent Office Study of Court Determinations of Validity/Invalidity, 1968-1972, [1973]
PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. No. 144 at F-l (BNA). See also Sprowl, Seventh Circuit
Review-Patent Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 527 (1974).
20. One commentator has concluded from a study that in trade secret cases
plaintiffs were successfuJ 47% of the time. Vandervoort, Trade Secrets: Protecting A
Very Special "Property," 26 Bus. LAW 681, 683 (1971).
21. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). See generally Arnold & Goldstein,
Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1235 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Phannaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178
F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd pel' curiam,?30 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960); Sinclair v.
Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 227, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 661 (1974). See
also A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); Bolt Assoc.
v. Alpine Geophysical Assoc., 244 F. Supp. 458, 463 (D.N.J. 1965), order vacated and
case remanded, 365 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1966). But see Choisser Research Corp. v.
Electronic Vision Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. 234 (BNA) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972). See generally
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton; of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 17
(1971).
23. Address of Roger Milgrim before the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Sec
tion of the American Bar Association (August 8, 1977).
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law. Although many states have enacted statutes which make it a
crime to appropriate trade secrets,24 and certain federal statutes,
such as the National Stolen Property Act,25 the Mail Fraud Stat
ute,26 the Federal Communications Fraud Statute,27 and section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act28 may sometimes be employed
against trade secret theft, the practitioner will in most cases be
retained to bring or defend a civil action involving the alleged mis
appropriation of trade secrets. This article endeavors to provide the
basic background needed by the practitioner to handle such a law
suit. After a discussion of the basis of th~ action, the elements
necessary to establish liability for trade secret misappropriation will
be reviewed in order to assist the practitioner in determining
whether the facts of a particular case are sufficient to establish liabil
ity. Discussion will then focus upon the relief available once liability
has been established. This article does not seek to reconcile the
apparent inconsistencies in the cases,29 nor does it attempt to high

24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 499(c) (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 18-4-408 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1809 (West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 15-1 to 9 (Smith-Hurd 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A, §§ 351-362 (West Supp. 1977);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30(4) (West 1970); MICH COMPo LAWS ANN.
§§ 752.711-.773 (Supp. 1977-78); MINN. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 609.52 (West Supp. 1977);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 637:1-11 (1974);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:119-5.1-.5 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-16-23 (1972);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.00, 155.30 & 165.07 (McKinney 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1331.51 (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (West Supp. 1976-77);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3930 (Purdon 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4238 to 4240
(1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 31.05 (Vernon 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.205
(West Supp. 1977-78).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970), discussed in Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on
Criminal Laws Relating to the Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 Bus. LAW. 1535 (1970);
Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the Protection of Know-How, 20
BUFFALO L. REV. 119, 123-26 (1970); Sutton, Trade Secrets Legislation, 9 IDEA 587
(1965). See also United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
974 (1966).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), discussed in OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note
8, at 315.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), discussed in OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note
8, at 315.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), discussed in Klein, supra note 8,
at 457-59; Comment, Industrial Espionage, supra note 8, at 921-23.
29. For such a discussion, see 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETI
TION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 51-59 (3d ed. 1968); R. ELLIS, TRADE SE
CRETS (1953); R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.01; 1 H. NIMS, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COM
PETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 141-161a (1947). See also A. TURNER, TRADE SECRETS
(1962). For an exhaustive bibliography of trade secret literature as of 1959, see
Rossman, Note on Trade Secrets, 3 PAT. T.M. COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUC.
211 (1959).
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light all the pitfalls of trade secret litigation. 3o Rather, its purpose is
to assist counsel's educational efforts by providing a foundation for a
.more detailed analysis of the facts in a given case.
1.

BASIS OF THE

LAw

OF TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION

Peabody v. Norfolpl is frequently cited as the seminal case for
much of the development of trade secrets law in the United States. 32
In Peabody, the plaintiff had invented new machinery and a new
manufacturing process. He hired the defendant as his machinist. In
the employment contract defendant agreed not to disclose knowl
edge he might gain concerning the machinery and process. Some
two years later, defendant quit his job with plaintiff and, in violation
of his agreement, communicated the information he had acquired to
others. In addition, he began to build machines like those of his
former employer. Plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from dis
closing the secret. Granting the injunction, the court reasoned that
one who:
[I]nvents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture,
whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an
exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in
good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a property in it,
which a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation
of contract and breach of conndence undertakes to apply it to his
own use, or to disclose it to third persons. 33

Although the court's decision seemed to rest primarily on the theory
that the trade secret was a property right of the plaintiff which
would be infringed by defendant's disclosure, it also relied on
theories of breach of contract and breach of confidence. 34
Subsequent cases have invoked all of the bases mentioned in
Peabody to provide a remedy to one whose confidential information
30. See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, Trial Tactics Trade Secret Cases, TRADE SECRETS
TODAY (P.L.1. 1971); Doyle and Joslyn, The Role of Counsel in Litigation InvolVing
Technologically Complex Trade Secrets, 6 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 743 (1965).
31. 98 Mass. 452 (1868). For a discussion of the antecedents of trade secret law
see Klein, supra note 8, at 437-40 (English common law); Schiller, Trade Secrets and
the Roman Law: The Actio Semi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 837 (1930) (Roman
law).
32. Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 660, 661 (8th Cir. 1944); Herold v. Herold
China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 9Il, 913 (6th Cir. 1919); Associated Press v. International
News Serv., 245 F. 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1917), afI'd, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See also E.
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at 368.
33. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868).
34. [d.
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has been used without authorization. 35 No single theory has been
universally embraced. 36 As recently as 1939, one commentator ob
served that the American law of trade secrets had still not "yet
crystallized around any particular pattern. "37 To Mr. Justice
Holmes, however, resolution of the issue of what theory should be
relied upon was easy:
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is
an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of
the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary require
ments of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable
secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are,
through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may
be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting
point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs, or one of them. 38

This violation of trust theory has been widely accepted in recent
years by the courts. 39 It dispenses with the need to establish the
existence of a contract or show that the plaintiff has a property right
in the matter for which protection is sought. Using this theory,
courts employ a fairness test, asking simply whether use or disclo
35. See, e.g, H.B. Wiggins Sons' Co. v. Cott-A-Lap Co., 169 F. 150 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1909) (implied contract); Roystone v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Inst.,
67 Misc. 265, 266, 122 N.Y.S. 444, 445 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (confidential relationship);
Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (1887) (property
right); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86, 86 A. 688, 691 (1913)
(property right).
36. Marcuse, The Protection of Trade Secrets: Theory and Practice, 36 CONN. B.
J. 348, 351 (1962); Note, Nature of Trade Secrets and Their Protection, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 254 (1928).
37. Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CrN. L. REV. 507, 558
( 1939).
38.. E.1. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
39. Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir.
1966) ("In general, the essence of the wrong is the obtaining of unjust enrichment and
unfair competitive advantage through inequitable conduct, usually a breach of confi
dence."); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953) ("The essence of ...
[plaintiffs'] action is not infringement [of a property right], but breach of faith.");
Junker v. Pl;"mmer, 320 Mass. 76,80,67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946) ("Relief is granted to
protect the secret only where one is attempting to use or disclose it in violation of
some general duty of good faith such as a breach of contract or abuse of confidence.");
Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 551, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141, app. denied,
270 App. Div. 921, 62 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1946) ("Protection is afforded ... against anyone
who has obtained the secret process by fraud or bad faith."). See also RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757, Comment a (1939); R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 5 (1953); T. ARNOLD,
Problems ill Trade Secret Law, 1961-62 ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT
SECTION, PROCEEDINGS 248, 251-52.
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sure by others would be inequitable. To answer this question, the
factfinder must focus upon the wrongfulness or unfairness of the
means by which the confidential information was obtained. 40 Such a
theory of protection has been justified on two grounds. First, it
encourages future research and development. Second, it helps to
maintain proper standards of commercial ethics. 41
Trade secret law, it must be noted, provides only such protec
tion as is necessary· to promote these policies. Others are free to
obtain precisely the same information and to use it so long as they
acquire it through fair and honest means, such as their own inde
pendent efforts, reverse engineering from the finished product to
discover ingredients or production methods, or from inadvertent or
intentional disclosure by the trade secret owner. 42
II.

ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY
FOR TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION

Although no single formulation for imputing liability for trade se
cret misappropriation has been universally accepted, the courts are
in general agreement that liability requires proof of three essential
elements: (A) The existence of a trade secret; (B) the acquisition of
the secret by a third party by improper conduct or unfair means; and
(C) the use or disclosure (or imminence of use or disclosure) by that
person of the trade secret to the trade secret owner's detriment. 43

40. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888,948-49
(1964); Comment, Corporate Privacy, supra note 3, at 403. See also Seismograph SeIV.
Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342, 354 (E.D. La. 1955) ("No single test
can be applied in all cases where improper acquisition of business information is
charged. The inventiveness of the devious mind staggers the imagination. It is simply
the difference between right and wrong, honesty and dishonesty, which is the
touchstone in an issue of this kind."). For a discussion of the theory of protection in
European countries, see Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CIN. L.
REV. 507 (1939); Trade Secrets, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 324 (1966).
41. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); National Tube Co. v.
Eastern Tube Co., 13 Ohio C.C. Dec. 468 (1902), aff'd, 69 Ohio St. 560, 70 N.E. 1127
(1903); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960). See also Water SeIVs.,
Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
42. E.1. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5thCir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d
216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974); Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 Wis. 668, 223 N.W.2d 536
(1974). Cf. K & G Oil Tool & SeIV. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool SeIV., 158 Tex. 594, 314
S.W.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) (the proper means of gaining possession
is through inspection and analysis of the product in order to create a duplicate). See
generally 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 53.3(a); I H. NIMS, supra note 29, § 148.
43. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.07(1); RESTATMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
See, e.g., Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. Fla.
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What Constitutes a Trade Secret

The definition of a trade secret most widely followed by the
courts 44 is that set forth in the Restatement of Torts, which provides
that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over compet
itors who do not know or use it. "45 Accordingly, in order to establish
a trade secret, plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that: (1) the
item or object he or she alleges to be a trade secret is subject matter
that will be protected as a trade secret; (2) it is not a matter of com
mon knowledge in the trade; (3) reasonable precautions have been
taken to maintain secrecy; and (4) it is of some value to plaintiff. 46

Protectible Subject Matter
Consistent with the Restatement's definition,47 almost any
item, knowledge, or information used in the conduct of one's busi
ness may be held by its possessor as a trade secret. 48 Thus, the
1.

1972), afI'd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975); Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F .
.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23
Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d lO2 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afI'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 960, 226
N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1962), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d 679, 235 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1963); Lowndes
Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
44. Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654
(1974); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cerl.
denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. RE. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93,
208 A.2d 74 (1965), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Cramp
ton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921 (1972); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz,
50 Misc. 2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, modified, 52 Misc. 2d 197,274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup.
Ct. 1966); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cerl. denied, 358
U.S. 898 (1958). See also R MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 2.01 (citing cases); Harding,
Trade Secrets and the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAw. 395, 398 (1967) ("every court
applies the well-known Restatement definition").
45. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939).
46. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974); R
MILGRIM, supra note 8, §§ 2.01-.08; E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROP
ERTY LAW PRIMER 117-51 (1975). Cj. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 202 (E.D. Wisc. 1969), afI'd in substance, rev'd on award of attorneys' fees sub
nom. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971) (consideration of
six factors which, upon analysis, are equivalent to the four factors noted in text).
47. The RESTATEMENT itself provides: "[Trade secrets] may be a formula for a
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a
pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757, Comment b (1939).
48. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 222 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly,
J.); International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907 (D. Del.
1951), afi'd, 248 F.2d 696 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); 2 R
CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 52; OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 8, at 300; 2
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technology used in production, such as plans, formulae, specifi
cations, and general "know-how," is considered to be protectible
trade secret subject matter,49 as is the machinery itself. 50 Similarly,
non-technological business information such as customer lists,51 raw
material sources,52 pricing and cost codes,53 methods of doing busi
ness,54 and market research studies55 may be protected as trade
secrets. 56 So broad is the definition that only two important types of
subject matter cannot be maintained as trade secrets: abstract ideas
or general principles which are not embodied in a specific form, 57
and information used in a business which is nevertheless considered
to belong to the firm's employees. 58 These exceptions are eminently
sensible, the former owing to the difficulties of enforcement,59 the
latter because otherwise the employees would be unable to change
employment without leaving their entire professional life and ex
perience behind. 60
STORY, EQUITY JURlSPRUDENCE § 1283 (1916). See generally R. MILGRlM, supra note
8, § 2.09 for an exhaustive collection of the cases discussing specific categories of
items, information, and knowledge.
49. Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 168 (D. Conn. 1951), mod
ified, 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Pressed Steel Car
Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904); A. TURNER, TRADE SECRETS
12-13 (1962); Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-How, 7 PAT. T.M. COPYRIGHT J. OF
RESEARCH & EDUC. 397 (1963).
50. See, e.g., A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th
Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935).
51. E.g., Town & Country House_& Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314,
189 A.2d 390 (1963); Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 278 N.E.2d 636, 328
N.Y.S.2d 423 (1972); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969) (collecting cases).
52. E.g., Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921·
(1972); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Assmann, 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N.Y.S. 334 (1918).
53. E.g., Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891).
54. E.g., Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Service Systems Corp. v.
Harriss, 41 App. Div. 2d 20, 341 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1973).
55. E.g., Western Electroplating Co. v. Henness, 180 Cal. App. 2d 442, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 434 (1960).
56. See generally Note, Trade Secret Protection of Non-Technical Competitive
Information, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1164 (1969).
57. E.g., Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946);
Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1934). Recovery for the
wrongful use of one's ideas has, however, been recognized under contract theories.
See, e.g., Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968).
58. E.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 403
F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Richard M. Krause, Inc. v. Gardner, 99 N.Y.S.2d 592
(Sup. Ct. 1950); Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 116 N.E. 951 (1917), cert. denied, 245
U.S. 662 (1917); A. TURNER, supra note 49, at 162-63.
59. See Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N.Y.S.2d
210 (1940).
60. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); and see generally
Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960).
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The scope of the latter exception has proven difficult to deter
mine. 61 While the courts agree that it encompasses the intellectual
equipment the employee brings to the job as well as skills and
knowledge that he would equally have acquired had he worked for
firms competing with his employer,62 no satisfactory standard for
classifying whether particular knowledge is the employer's trade se
cret or part of an employee's general competence has emerged from
the cases. 63 Consequently, any predictability of results seems im
possible. Each case will turn upon its own facts and a court's reac
tion to them.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton &
CO.64 illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between knowledge
which belongs to a firm and that which belongs to its employees. In
Hutton, three account executives, who specialized in option writing
and trading, quit plaintiff and joined a competing brokerage firm.
The original employer sued both the individuals and their new em
ployer, alleging, inter alia, trade secret misappropriation. Plaintiff
claimed that the individuals took to their new employment certain
"option ledgers" which contained information concerning the start
ing price, expiration date, and profit and loss history of various kinds
and classes of options. 65 The court rejected plaintiff's trade secret
claim. It found that the option ledgers were created by the three
individuals, that plaintiff did not require that such records be kept,
that the ledgers related to accounts which the individuals them
selves had personally obtained rather than accounts given to them
by plaintiff, that account executives customarily made photocopies of
such records for themselves when they changed employment, and
that the removal of such records was in conformity with industry
practice. 66 Based upon these findings, the court stated that "it would
be difficult for this Court to find, with any degree of assurance at
this stage, that the documents are valuable assets of plaintiff's busi
61. Note, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324,
326 (1963); and see generally Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 888,950-51 (1964).
62. See Tempo Instrument, Inc. Y. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (E.D.N.Y.
1964); Aronson Y. Orloy, 228 Mass. 1, 5, 116 N.E. 951, 953 (1917), cert. denied, 245
U.S. 662 (1917).
63. Compare Sperry Rand Corp. y. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964)
with Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. y. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
64. 403 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
65. Id. at 338-39.
66. Id. at 339-42.
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ness."67 No criteria were advanced nor competing interests weighed
to justify this conclusion; the court simply weighed the facts and
circumstances of the case.
In an attempt to establish workable guidelines, some courts
have specifically held that if the subject matter of the claimed trade
secret had been created through the application of the employee's
own skill, such knowledge then belongs to the employee. 68 In such a
case, absent an express covenant by the employee not to use or
disclose such information, or a situation in which the employer has
assigned the employee the task of developing such information and
committed company resources to the project, the employee is free
to use or disclose it in subsequent activity. 69
Despite the exceptions, a wide variety of business items and
information can qualify as protectible subject matter. From a practi
cal standpoint, therefore, it will be the rare case, such as Hutton,
that will involve information that cannot qualify as matter subject
to trade secret protection. Dispute as to whether business items or
information qualifies as a trade secret typically focuses on the other
elements of plaintiff's case.
2.

Not Common Knowledge

The fundamental basis for legal protection, as the trade secret
name suggests, is that the matter be retained in secrecy.70 In other
words, it "must be the particular secrets of the employer as dis
tinguished from the general secrets of the trade in which he is
engaged. "71 Matters which are generally known in the trade or
business cannot form the basis of a trade secret7 2 since their misap
propriation can cause little or no damage. 73
The determination of whether the matter in question is not
67. Id. at 341.
68. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering !'i1echanics Research
Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); New Method Die & Cut-Out Co. v.
Milton Bradley Co., 289 Mass. 277, 194 N.E. 80 (1935); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa.
569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960), criticized in 74 HARV. L. REV. 1473 (1961).
69. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 5.02(3).
70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Stedman, Trade Secrets,
23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 6 (1962). See generally R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, §§ 2.05-06
(collecting cases).
71. Klein, supra note 8, at 441.
72. See Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198,246 P.2d 11 (1952);
National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d
357, appeal dismissed, 274 App. Div. 822, 81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1948).
73. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796,805 (D. Del. 1920).
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common knowledge is a question of fact to be answered by the trier
of fact. 74 The cases have established guidelines to help the factfinder
make this determination. Claims of secrecy will be defeated by a
showing that a competitor of the alleged trade secret's owner had
previously used the matter in question in its business,75 that defen
dant had already been using the information,76 that the information
had been widely circulated before the alleged misappropriation, 77
that the information could be derived from readily available
sources,78 or that it had been published in a patent grant. 79 More
over, lack of secrecy may be inferred from the manner in which
defendants treated the information prior to the litigation. 80
74. See Kodekey Elecs., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1973);
see also R. MILGIRM, supra note 8, § 2.03. See Cummings, Some Aspects of Trade
Secrets and Their Protection: The Public Domain and the "Unified Description"
Requirement, ';;4 Ky. L.J. 190 (1966) for a discussion of many of the problems in de
termining whelher
the alleged secret is in fact secret.
I
75. See Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp.
1173 (D. Ariz. 1973).
76. See Chemithon Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 287 F. Supp. 291, 317 (D.
Md. 1968).
77. See Bimba Mfg. Co. v. Starz Cylinder Co., 119 Ill. App. 2d 251,256 N.E.2d
357 (1969). There is no uniformity in the cases as to how widespread the information
has to be before it loses its secrecy.
78. See Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 278 N.E.2d 636, 328 N.Y.S.2d
423 (1972). The mere fact that the claimed trade secret consists of several components
each of which by itself is in the public domain does not, however, preclude protection
so long as the trade secret, as a "unified process," is kept secret. Imperial Chern.
Indus. Ltd. v. National Distillers and Chern. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965).
79. See Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp. 516, 524 (E.D. Ill. 1959),
afr d per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); Comment, Trade Secrets After Patent
Publication: a PUllitive Injunction, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 313 (1963). The mere appli
cation for a patent, however, does not constitute public disclosure, Sandlin v. Johnson,
141 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1944); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d
531 (6th Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935), as the Patent Office is required to
keep the applications confidential. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (Supp. v 1975). As to whether
an applicant is deemed to have made a public disclosure of an alleged trade secret
when the Patent Office rejects as unpatentable the application embodying the al
leged trade secret, compare Brown v. Fowler, 316 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958)
(subject matter remains as protectible trade secret where mechanical patent rejected,
but design patent granted) with American Gage & Mfg. Co. v. Maasdam, 245 F.2d 62
(6th Cir. 1957) (subject matter denied protection as trade secret where the patent
rejection was premised on the ground that it was fully disclosed by the prior art). See
also Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. dellied, 422 U.S. 1056
(1975) (abandoned patent applications are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, (West 1977); Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic
Advanced Metals, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. 595 (B.N.A. Mass. Super. Ct. 1971) (where pa
tent application is withdrawn, subject matter can still be protected as trade secret).
Under Patent Office regulations, rejected patent applications are retained in con
fidence. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (1977).
80. See, e.g., Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic Advanced Metals, Inc. 172
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It is important to distinguish cases in which the possessor of the
information has revealed it to another in confidence or under an
express or implied obligation not to use or disclose it. 81 Such a
confidential disclosure does not destroy the element of secrecy.
Thus, protection has been accorded to information that has been
revealed to prospective purchasers or licensees,82 to information
disclosed to employees involved in the manufacturing process in
which it is used,83 and to information disclosed to employees in the
form of blueprints and drawings. 84 The theory is that commercial
reality requires such disclosure, for otherwise the information would
be without practical value. 85
Similarly, public marketing does not make trade secrets, that
are incorporated into a product, common knowledge if those secrets
cannot be discovered by reverse engineering, inspection of the prod
uct itself, or similar investigatory methods. 86 Thus, even after a prod
uct is on the market or otherwise placed in the public domain, the
process by which it is manufactured, engineering benefits or eco
nomic savings derived from certain of its features, or the nature of
its constituent elements may still remain the subject of trade secret
protection. 87 The courts have, however, consistently held that when
the alleged trade secret is ascertainable by inspection of the product
the sale constitutes a public disclosure of these trade secrets. 88
U.S.P.Q. 595 (B.N.A. Mass. Super. Ct. 1971); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v.
Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
81. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(c) (1939); OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra
note 8, at 300-01.
82. See Heyman v. A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1963);
Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir.), Gert. denied, 298 U.S.
673 (1935).
83. See Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), Gert. denied, 389 U.S.
829 (1967).
84. See Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Riteoff, Inc. v. Contact Indus., Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 731, 350 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1973).
85. 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 53.3.
86. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, §§ 2.05(2)-.05(3). See, e.g., A.H. Emery Co.
v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968). Tabor
v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); K & G Oil Tool & Servo CO. V. G & G
Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
87. A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), Gert. denied,
393 U.S. 835 (1968); Weil-McLain CO. V. Andro Corp., [1976-1977] PAT. T.M. &
COPYRIGHT J. No. 333 at A-16 (BNA) (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
88. See Juliano V. Hobart Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 453 (D. Mass. 1961), aff'd per
curiam, 303 F.2d 830 (1st Cir. 1962); Carver V. Harr, 132 N.J. Eq. 207, 27 A.2d 895
(Ch. 1942); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939). Even though the
product would have to be rendered inoperative and examined by a skilled engineer in
order for the trade secret contained therein to be discovered, this rule prevails. See
Midland-Ross Corp. V. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1961).
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Closely related to this point is that once there has been a mis
appropriation of a trade secret by improper means,89 the fact that
such information was also available to the public, including the de
fendant, does not preclude plaintiff from securing relief if he can
prove the elements of his case. 90 As the court in Franke v.
Wiltschek 91 pointed out, the determinative question is not whether
the defendant could have obtained the information from public
sources, but rather whether in fact he did so obtain it. This principle
was applied in Smith v. Dravo Corp.92 In Dravo, the plaintiff dis
closed the design for steel freight containers to defendant, a pro
spective purchaser of plaintiff's -business. Shortly afterwards, defen
dant began manufacturing a container of similar design. At the time
plaintiff made the disclosure to defendant, 100 of plaintiff's contain
ers were in public use. The court held that the information about
plaintiffs design acquired by defendant was, nevertheless, protected
against unauthorized use. "[T]he mere fact that such lawful acquisi
tion is available," the court observed, "does not mean that [defen
dant] may, through a breach of confidence, gain the information in
usable form and escape the efforts of inspection and analysis. "93 In
several other cases the courts have similarly recognized that the pub
lic availability of a trade secret does not defeat a claim of trade secret
misappropriation when the owner of the trade secret has conveyed it
to another party subject to a contractual duty forbidding its use or
disclosure. 94
There are cases, however, that reject the reasoning followed in
Dravo. 95 The differing views can be attributed to the courts' varying
opinions as to the appropriate standard of commercial morality. As
the court stated in Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can CO.96:
89. See text infra at notes 126-76 for a discussion of what constitutes improper
means.
90. See Telex Corp. Y. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 929-30 (10th Cir.), cert. dis
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).
91. 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
92. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
93. Id. at 375.
94. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis.
1969), afI'd in substance, rev'd on award of attorney's fees, 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir.
1971) (implied from circumstances of business dealings); Sinclair Y. Aquarius Elecs.,
Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974) (license agreement); K & G Oil
Tool & Servo Co. y. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) (lease).
95. See Northup y. Reish, 200 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1953); Sandlin y. Johnson, 152
F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1945); Van Prod. Co. y. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa.
248,268,213 A.2d 769, 780 (1965).
96. 72 N.]. Eq. 387, 395-96, 67 A. 339, 343 (1907).
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[T]oo much emphasis has perhaps been placed upon the element
of absolute secrecy in the process, and that not enough stress has
been laid upon the inequitable character of the defendants' con
duct in making a use of such process that was inimical to the
complainant's interests. . . . [T]he secrecy with which a court of
equity deals is not necessarily that absolute secrecy that inheres in
discovery, but that qualified secrecy that arises from mutual
understanding, and that is required alike by good faith and by
good morals. 97

Since the tendency of the law has been in the direction of im
posing higher standards of commercial morality in trade dealings, 98
most courts seem to favor the principle espoused in Dravo. 99

3.

Reasonable Precautions

The courts have consistently held that reasonable steps must be
taken to protect and preserve the secrecy of the subject matter that
is the alleged trade secret. 100 The theory is that the owner of the
information, having made no effort to maintain it in secrecy, is in
dicating that he or she does not consider it to be a trade secret and
thus the law should not. 101 The degree of secrecy required, how
ever, is not absolute. 102 Plaintiff need only establish that under the
circumstances reasonable precautions were employed to ensure that
the subject matter remained secret. 103
A recent case that exemplifies this requirement is]. T. Healy &
Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Sons, Inc. 104 Defendant, James A.
97.

Id.

98.

E.g., Vitro Corp. v. Hall Chern. Co., 254 F.2d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 1958); Seis

mograph Servo Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342, 354-55 (E.D. La.
1955).
99. See, e.g., McKinzie V. Cline, 197 Or. 184,252 P.2d 564 (1953).
100. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & CO. V. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012,
1015-16 (5th Cir. 1970), cer!. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); General Aniline & Film
Corp. V. Frantz, 50 Misc. 2d 994, 999, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606, modified, 52 Misc. 2d
197, 274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966); R MILGlUM, supra note 8, § 2.04 (collecting
cases).
101. J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 738,
260 N.E.2d 723, 730-31 (1970); Gallowhur Chern. Corp. V. Schwerdle, 37 N.J. Super.
385, 117 A.2d 416 (Ch. Div. 1955).
102. See Space Aero Prod. Co. v. RE. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74,
supplemented, 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 699, cer!. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
103. See Schulenburg V. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965),
cer!. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966); Lowndes Prods., Inc. V. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 331,
191 S.E.2d 761, 766 (1972); R MILGlUM, supra note 8, § 2.04. Ultimately, this is a
question for the trier offact to resolve. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471,474
(9th Cir. 1974).
104. 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 (1970).
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Murphy, had worked for the plaintiff, a jewelry findings business, 105
since 1936. He had served most recently as an officer and director.
Murphy quit plaintiff's employ to set up a rival business. Sub
sequently, plaintiff charged him and others with trade secret misap
propriation. It alleged that defendant was using some of plaintiff's
jewelry findings processes. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts held that plaintiff had failed to establish that its processes
were trade secrets because the requirement of reasonable precau
tions was not met. The court observed that these processes were
openly used as part of plaintiff's manufacturing processes. No par
titions were set up to shield them from disclosure. Employees
were not required to sign a nondisclosure agreement, nor were
notices posted cautioning workers not to disclose or discuss the
processes. The court held that these omissions amounted to a "con
scious" decision not to maintain secrecy. To earn trade secret pro
tection, an employer must constantly admonish his or her employees
that processes or ideas are secret and must be kept so. An affirma
tive program of "constant and reasonable steps" to maintain secrecy
must be proved, }md "eternal vigilance" to ensure its effectiveness
must be maintained. While the intent of the program necessarily
varies from industry to industry and from plant to plant, each em
ployer must at least give "constant warnings to all persons to whom
the trade secret has become known and [obtain] from each an
agreement, preferably in writing, acknowledging its secrecy and
promising to respect it. To exclude the public from the manufactur
ing area is not enough. "106
Similarly, in Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle,107 the court deter
mined that plaintiff failed to maintain adequate secrecy. In Wheel
abrator, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin defendant's use of an al
legedly secret process for making steel shot to be used as an
abrasive. Plaintiff argued that defendant had agreed in a written
employment contract to respect plaintiff's trade secrets and that en
tering into this agreement constituted a reasonable and sufficient
precaution. The court held that the contract was not controlling on
this point, noting that defendant was in a relatively weak bargaining .
position when he executed the contract, and, more importantly, that

105. Jewelry findings are pieces of metal that are produced by using dies, and
which are then sold to jewelry manufacturers who finish the pieces. ld. at 731, 260
N.E.2d at 726-27.
106. ld. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 731.
107. 317 F. Supp. 633 (W.D. La. 1970).
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plaintiff failed to take further adequate security precautions. Al
though plaintiff had fenced in its manufacturing facilities and estab
lished guard houses at various entrance points, the court was unim
pressed. It observed that rather lax "general security management,"
which embraced both secret and nonsecret facilities alike, was not
by itself a reasonable precaution for purposes of trade secret protec
tion. More must be shown than compliance with the custom of many
manufacturers "to exclude the general public from an inspection of
their methods. "108 The court stressed:
[Tlhe apparent routine ness that customers, potential customers,
independent contractors, and repairmen were allowed admission
to the plant .... [Mlany of the people that were allowed to tour
the plant were engineers and professionals, some of whom the de
fendant personally conducted in descriptive tours. Almost all, if not
all, of the alleged secret processes were visible, and only a few in
terior modifications to machinery were not observable. Significantly
there was no evidence of contractual relationships between those
touring the plant and Wheelabrator. Nor was there evidence of
admonitions or notice to the independent contractors and repair
men as to the allegedly confidential nature of the operations. lOS

For these reasons, among others, the court concluded that plaintiff
had failed to take reasonable precautions under the circumstances to
preserve the secrecy of its steel shot manufacturing processes.
E.I. duPont deNenwurs & Co., Inc. v. Christopher llO stresses
the point that while precautions must be take~, they need only be
reasonable. Plaintiff was constructing an addition to a plant which,
when completed, would manufacture methanol by a secret process.
Because some of the buildings were unfinished, parts of the process
were exposed to aerial view. Defendants were charged with flying
over and photographing the unfinished addition. They argued that
plaintiffs, in the exercise of reasonable precautions, should have put
a roof over the unfinished plant. The court held that failure to con
struct a roof was not unreasonable in these circumstances. "Reason
able precautions against predatory eyes we may require," the court
wrote, "but an impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable require
ment. . "111
108. Id. at 638 (quoting Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Williamson Heater Co.,
269 F. 614, 615 (6th Cir. 1920)).
109. Id.
llO. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
lli. Id.at1017.
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The lessons of these cases seem clear. Plaintiff must establish at
the very least that he or she pursued some of the following: Restrict
ing outside visitors from the manufacturer's plant where the alleged
trade secret is used; limiting access to it only to those who have a
need to know; maintaining it in a secure location; and advising those
who have access to it that it is confidential. Whether or not more
measures will have to be implemented will depend on the circum
stances. 112

4.

Value

It is clear that courts will not extend trade secret protection to
all secret information. Only those secrets which provide a distinct
competitive advantage over others who are neither aware of nor use
them will be protected. 113 This advantage constitutes value. 114 Ex
pressed another way, this element means that the possessor of an
item for which trade secret protection is sought musfestablish that it
involves a discovery or an advance in the industry. 115 Value will then
be inferred. 116
This requirement suggests an analogy to patent law, which re
quires for patentability that the elements of novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness must appear to a person "having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains. "117 The cases have,
however, explicitly rejected the application of the patent standard to
trade secret litigation. us As noted above, the definition of value
requires some degree of novelty, l:iut the degree required is not as
great as it is for patent protection. Some novelty is required "if
merely because that which does not possess novelty is usually
112. For discussions of trade secret protection programs, see PROBLEMS OF BUSI
NESS AND INDUSTRIAL SECURITY (R. Needham ed. 1971); Harding, Trade Secrets and
the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAW. 395, 402-04 (1967); Vandervoort, supra note 20, at
685-88.
113. See Cudahy Co. v. American Labs, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Neb.
1970).
114. Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or. 139, 156, 374 P.2d 912, 920-21 (1962).
115. See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953); Sinclair v. Aquarius
Elecs., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974).
116. A. TURNER, supra note 49, at 24.
117. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970); see notes 10-13 supra.
118. Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); A.O. Smith Corp. v.
Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934
(1935); cf. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 258 (S.D. Cal.
1958) (subject matter must be "of a character which does not occur to persons in the
trade with knowiedge of the state of the art or which cannot be evolved by those
skilled in the art from the theoretical description of the process, or compilation or
compendia of information or knowledge").
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known, "119 and consequently of no value. 120
The fact that the alleged trade secret was inexpensive to de
velop or that it is easily discoverable does not establish that it has no
value.1 21 Such a view is eminently sensible. So long as a trade secret
gives one's business a significant competitive advantage over others
who do not have it, value should be inferred. Making factors such as
cost or ease of development determinative would only invite litiga
tion and result in arbitrary decisions as to how much money estab
lishes "considerable cost" and what constitutes "ease of discovery. "122
Several courts require the plaintiff to prove regular use of the
alleged secret in his or her business as part of the "value" require
ment. 123 One commentator has observed that this line of cases is
based upon judicial reluctance to raise "an untested and perhaps un
implemented idea to the status of a ... [provable] right"124 without
some evidence indicating that the discoverer has the capacity to put
119. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
120. This does not mean that this element is simple to establish. On the contrary,
the courts have shown that the parties will still have to meet their requisite burden of
proof. See, e.g., Nickelson v. General Motors Corp., 361 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1966)
(claimed trade secret was a trivial advance); Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury
Food Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Neb. 1974) (value of claimed trade
secret was insignificant).
121. International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907,
913 (D. Del. 1951) (relief will not be refused simply because plaintiff's trade secret
might probably be discovered by independent experiment); L. M. Rabinowitz & Co. v.
Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431, 438 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (court will not speculate whether defen
dant could have discovered plaintiff's trade secret by examining the "prior art");
R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 2.02(2) ("Since it is established that a trade secret can be
discovered fortu;tously (ergo, without costly development), or result purely from the
exercise of creative faculties, it would appear inconsistent to consider expense of
development of a trade secret as an operative substantive element. [footnote omit
ted]").
122. Contra, Manos v. Melton, 358 Mich. 500, 509, 100 N.W.2d 235, 239 (1960),
criticized in 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324, 336-38 (1963). Although the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939), singles out the amount of money or effort expended
as a factor in determining whether a trade secret exists, it does not give controlling
weight to such a factor. In this regard, it may be said that if a plaintiff can establish
that its secret information was developed only after considerable time and expense
such proof may aid the plaintiff's case. Compare Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron
Battery, Inc., 19 III. App. 3d 299, 316, 311 N.E.2d 386, 400 (1974) (may be of sig
nificance) with Wildowsky v. Dudek, 30 Conn. Supp. 288, 289, 310 A.2d 766, 767
(C.P. 1972) (will not help).
123. E.g., Victor Chern. Works v. Iliff, 299 III. 532, 548, 132 N.E. 806, 812
(1921); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939); contra, Ferroline Corp. v.
General Aniline and Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 953 (1954); Smith v. Dravo, 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). The Victor line of
cases is criticized in OPPENHEIM & WESTON, supra note 8, at 312-13.
124. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 2.02(1).
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the idea to use. In addition, the "regular use" requirement helps the
court to fix the value of the secret for the purpose of awarding
damages. Although this requirement does not pose any problems
where the trade secret is being commercially used, it may create a
problem in the research and development, experimental, or other
precommercial stages. 125
B.

What Constitutes Acquisition by Improper or Wrongful Means

Having established the existence of a trade secret, plaintiff must
then establish that the defendant obtained that trade secret by im
proper or wrongful means. No complete catalogue of what consti
tutes such means can be compiled since, as one court has explained,
" 'Improper' will always be a word of many nuances, determined by
time, place, and circumstances. "126 Some general guidelines, how
ever, have been developed.
It is well established that when one who stands in neither a
fiduciary nor confidential relationship to the trade secret owner ac
quires a secret by means that are "independently unlawful," the test
of improper conduct is satisfied. 127 Among such means are: "theft,
trespass, bribing or otherwise inducing employees or others to re
veal the information in breach of duty, fraudulent misrepre
sentations, threats of harm by unlawful conduct, wiretapping, pro
curing one's own employees or agents to become employees of the
other for purposes of espionage.... "128
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently discussed
and extended the definition of "independently unlawful means" in
E.I. duPont deNemours v. Christopher. 129 The decision is impor
tant because of its rationale as well as its result. The court showed
its willingness to look beyond current case law categories of tortious
conduct and to base a finding of "unlawfulness" upon a careful

125. See Englehard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347,
353 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964). See generally R. MILGRIM,
supra note 8, § 2.02.
126. E.!. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
127. See' Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953); Eastern Extract
ing Co. v. Greater New York Extracting Co., 126 App. Div. 928, 930-31, 110 N.Y.S.
738,741 (1908); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 575, 314 S.W.2d 763,769, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); Developments in the Law---Competitive Torts, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 888, 949 (1964).
128. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759, Comment c (1939).
129. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
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analysis of the challenged conduct and its surrounding circum
stances.
In Christopher, the defendants were charged with wrongfully
obtaining plaintiff's trade secrets and selling them to an undisclosed
third party. The complaint alleged that the defendants took several
aerial photographs of one of plaintiff's facilities that was then in an
unfinished condition, which left parts of plaintiff's secret methanol
manufacturing process exposed to view from the air. This process,
plaintiff claimed, was developed after much expensive and time
consuming research. The complaint further alleged that the process
gave plaintiff a valuable competitive advantage over other produc
ers, and was, consequently, a trade secret which it had taken special
precautions to safeguard. Plaintiff sought damages and an injunction.
The defendants unsuccessfully moved for dismissal for failure to
state a claim.
On appeal,130 the 'defendants argued that they had committed
no "actionable wrong" either in photographing plaintiff's facility or
in passing the photographs on to another party because "they con
ducted all of their activities in public airspace, violated no govern
ment aviation standard, did not breach any confidential relation,
and did not engage in any fraudulent or illegal conduct. "131 In sum,
they argued that misappropriation of trade secrets cannot be action
able where no violation of an explicit legal prohibition has occurred.
The Fifth Circuit, in rejecting these arguments, squarely held
that aerial photography, otherwise lawful, is an improper means of
obtaining a trade secret. 132 Its rationale was clear:
One may use his competitor's secret process if he discovers the
process by reverse engineering applied to the finished product;
one may use a competitor's process if he discovers it by his own
independent research; but one may not avoid these labors by
taking the process from the discoverer without his permission at a .
time when he is taking reasonable precautions to maintain its
secrecy. 133

In other words, one may not obtain knowledge of another's trade
secret without spending the time and money necessary to discover it
130.
from the
granted.
131.
132.
133.

The trial court granted the defendant's motion for an interlocutory appeal
court's ruling that plaintiff had stated a claim upon which relief would be
431 F.2d at 1014.
Id. at 1015.
Id.
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independently, unless the owner voluntarily discloses it or fails to
take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy. Significantly, the
court was unpersuaded by defendant's argument that it had only
followed generally accepted standards of commercial morality. It
wrote:
In taking this position we realize that industrial espionage of
the sort here perpetrated has become a popular sport in some seg
ments of our industrial community. However, our devotion to
free wheeling industrial competition must not force us into ac
cepting the law of the jungle as the standard of morality expected
in our commercial relations. 134
The significance of Christopher lies in its expansive and flexible
definition of what constitutes the acquisition of a trade secret by
"independently unlawful" means by one who does not stand in a
fiduciary or contractual relationship to the trade secret's owner. Its
definition embraces acquisition by any method other than indepen
dent development, reverse engineering, or disclosure by the owner,
whether or not that method violates specific legal prohibitions.
A second situation in which the courts will find a means of
obtaining trade secrets to be improper, though "far less pemici
OUS"135 than acquisition by inherently unlawful means, occurs when
one uses for his or her own purposes a trade secret revealed under
an obligation not to use it. 136 It is not necessary to show that there
was an express agreement not to use the trade secret. 137 Rather,
"[t]he existence of a confidential relationship, arising prior to or
concurrent with disclosure of a trade secret, imposes an absolute (as
opposed to relative) duty not to use or disclose the secret."138
Whether or not such a confidential relationship exists will, in turn,
depend upon an analysis of the facts and circumstances of each
individual case. 139 When the facts show that a disclosure was made

134. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added). The court further added: ''The market place
must not deviate from our mores." Id. at 1017 (emphasis added).
135. Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the Protection of
Know-How, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 119, 136 (1970).
136. See R. MILGlUM, supra note 8, §§ 4.03, 5.01-.03 (collecting cases); Annat., 9
A.L.R.3d 665, § 3(a) (1966) (collecting cases).
137. See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953); Telechron, Inc.
v. Parissi, 197 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1952); Brown v. Fowler, 316 S.w.2d 111, 114
(Tex. Ct. App. 1958); 31 CORNELL L.Q. 382 (1946). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396 (1958).
138. R. MILGlUM, supra note 8, § 4.03 (footnotes omitted).
139. Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp., 502 F.2d 802,
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in order to further a particular relationship, confidentiality will be
implied. 140 The required element of confidentiality has frequently
been found when disclosures have been made in the context of the
following business relationships: Manufacturer-independent contrac
tor;141 manufacturer-distributor;142 supplier-purchaser;143 inventor
potential manufacturer;144 licensor-licensee;145 and, owner of busi
ness-potential buyer of business. 146
Kamin v. Kuhnau 147 illustrates this principle. Plaintiff had de
signed a garbage truck that compressed trash through the use of a
hydraulically operated "plow," and thereby increased the truck's
capacity. The defendant was hired by plaintiff to construct the trucks
at defendant's facilities, using plaintiff's design. After ten trucks had
been built, defendant terminated the relationship and began to in
dependently manufacture and sell garbage trucks, which were very
similar to those which he had manufactured for plaintiff. Plaintiff
then sued to enjoin defendant's use of its truck design, contending
that the design was a trade secret. After determining that plaintiff's
design was indeed secret, the court addressed the question of
"whether the disclosure to defendant ... of plaintiff's design for a
garbage packer unit was made under such circumstances as to raise
an implication of a promise by Kuhnau not to appropriate the design
to his own use."148 The court held that the relationship between the
parties was such that an obligation not to appropriate the design

808 (9th Cir. 1974); Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 389 (7th CiT.
1967); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or. 139, 152, 374 P.2d 912, 919 (1962).
140. Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1967);
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953); Schreyer v. Casco Prods.
Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 924 (2d CiT. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952).
141. McKinzie v. Cline, 197 Or. 184, 191, 252 P.2d 564, 567 (1953).
142. Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953) (disclosure to defendants
to assist them in selling plaintiff's product).
143. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis.
1969), afI'd in substance, rev'd on award of attorney's fees sub nom. Forest Labs.,
Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971).
144. William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264
(W.D. Pa. 1951) (plaintiff exhibited article to defendant for purpose of selling or leas
ing it to latter).
145. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 575, 314 S.W.2d 763, 769, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) (defendant gained knowledge of trade' secret through
licensing agreement with plaintiff).
146. See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953) (disclosure to
defendant for purpose of selling business to it).
147. 232 Or. 139,374 P.2d 912 (1962).
148. Id. at 146, 374 P.2d at 916.

26

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:1

could be inferred. Since the defendant was paid to assist the plaintiff
in commercially exploiting the design, the court reasoned that:
It must have been apparent to Kuhnau that plaintiff was attempt
ing to produce a unit which could be marketed. Certainly it would
not have been contemplated that as soon as the packer unit was
perfected Kuhnau would have the benefit of plaintiff's ideas and
the perfection of the unit through painstaking and expensive ex
perimentation. 149

Consequently, the court concluded that the defendant "violated his
duty to plaintiff by appropriating the information derived through
their business relationship. "150
Similar reasoning was employed in Smith v. Dravo Corp. 151
In the early 1940's, Leathem Smith had designed and developed
steel freight containers, called "Safeway Containers." These contain
ers possessed several novel features which made them very attrac
tive for use in boat and rail shipping. The defendant corporation
became interested in the containers after learning how success
ful they were. It approached Smith's company seeking to purchase
the containers. During the course of these negotiations, Mr. Smith
died and his heirs decided to sell the container business. Defendant
expressed an interest in such a purchase. Consequently, a represen
tative of Smith's company sent detailed information to defendant
concerning the container's designs, plans, and prospective custom
ers. The negotiations ultimately broke off. Shortly thereafter, defen
dant began to manufacture containers adopting many, if not all, of
the features of plaintiff's -design. Plaintiff then brought an action for
trade secret misappropriation alleging that defendant had obtained
knowledge of plaintiff's trade secrets through a confidential relation
ship and then wrongfully violated that confidentiality by using the
secrets to its advantage. After rejecting the argument that no trade
secrets were involved, the court considered whether defendant had
149. [d. at 142-53,374 P.2d at 919.
150. [d. at 155, 374 P.2d at 920. To further support its holding, the court wrote:
If our system of private enterprise on which our nation has thrived, prospered
and grown great is to survive, fair dealing, honesty and good faith between
contracting parties must be zealously maintained; therefore, if one who has
learned of another's invention through contractual relationship, such as exists
in the present case, takes unconscionable and inequitable advantage of the
other to his own enrichment and at the expense of the latter, a court of equity
will extend its broad equitable powers to protect the party injured.
Id. at 155,374 P.2d at 920 (quoting McKinzie v. Cline, 197 Or. 184, 195,252 P.2d 564,
569 (1953)).
151. . 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
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gained knowledge of those secrets during the existence of a confi
dential relationship. It concluded that a confidential relationship did
exist between the parties:
Here plaintiffs disclosed their design for one purpose, to enable
defendant to appraise it with a view in mind of purchasing the
business. There can be no question that defendant knew and
understood this limited purpose. Trust was reposed in it by plain
tiffs that the information thus transmitted would be accepted sub
ject to that limitation. 152

That the transactions with plaintiffs were at arms length did not, in
the court's view, dictate a contrary result. "That fact," the court
wrote, "does not detract from the conclusion that but for those very
transactions defendant would not have learned, from plaintiffs, of
the container design. The implied limitation on the use to be made
of the infromation had its roots in the 'arms-length' transaction. "153
Breach of a confidential relationship as an improper means of
acquisition is most frequently invoked when an employee resigns,
takes with him his former employer's trade secrets, and joins a
competitor or establishes a competing business in which the trade
secret is used. 154 It is frequently held that the employment rela
tionship is confidential155 and that "[t]he existence of such relation
ship between employer and employee imposes a duty upon the
employee not to use or disclose the employer's confidential informa
tion to the employer's detriment. "156 A confidential relationship will
not arise, however, if the employee does not know that the informa
tion is confidential and valuable. 157 As one commentator has ob
152. [d. at 376.
153. Id. at 377.
154. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Anti-Trust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1435 (1967); Klein, supra note 8, at
452-54.
155. See Harry R. Defler Corp. v. Kleeman, 19 App. Div. 2d 396, 401, 243
N.Y.S.2d 930, 935 (1963), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 694, 225 N.E.2d 569, 278 N.Y.S.2d
883 (1967); Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 200, 197 N.E. 217, 218 (1935); B. F.
Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 500,192 N.E.2d 99,105 (1963); E.
KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 46, at 151. But see National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman,
409 S.W.2d 1, 35 (Mo. 1966).
156. R. MILGRlM, supra note 8, § 5.02(1).
157. See Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Guardian Glass Co., 322 F. Supp. 854,
865 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 462 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.), cut. denied, 409 U.S. 1039
(1972); National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 736, 79
N.Y.S.2d 357, 361, app. denied, 274 App. Div. 822,81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1948). It should
also be noted that there would be no breach of a confidential relationship if the
employer had acquiesced in the taking of the trade secret. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch,
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served: "There can be no betrayal of confidence unless there is a
confidence to betray and it is known to be a confidence."158 Such
knowledge can, of course, be found to exist on the ground that
under the circumstances the employee has or should have reason to
believe the information is confidential. 159
Thus, in Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 160 one of the de
fendants, Dobrowolski, who had been plaintiff's sales manager, left
plaintiff to join another company. Plaintiff's company manufactured
flavored and unflavored mouthguards. The company that hired
defendant had never been in the mouthguard business, but within
two weeks of Dobrowolski's arrival, it studied the product's poten
tial. Subsequently, the company began to manufacture and market
the mouthguard. Plaintiff claimed that Dobrowolski had knowl
edge of his trade secrets concerning the production and sale of
mouthguards, and that he was using them to benefit his new em
ployer. The court held that the manufacturing technique was a trade
secret which was disclosed to Dobrowolski. It was further deter
mined that the disclosure was made in the course of a confidential
relationship because the evidence, including Dobrowolski's own tes
timony, established that he was aware of its confidential nature. The
court therefore held that Dobrowolski had gained the trade secret
through improper means. 161
It is important to note that the employer does not lose his
protection when the former employee reconstructs secret technical
information from memory.162 Thus, in A.H. Emery Co. v. Marean
Products Corp., 163 plaintiff charged that a former employee, Mills,
had memorized its trade secrets regarding the design, construction,
and manufacture of a hydraulic load cell, and then disclosed them to
the defendant company. The trial court ruled that "it is as much a
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 403 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mich.
1975); Metal Lubricants Co. v. Engineered Lubricants Co., 284 F. Supp. 483, 488-89
(E.D. Mo. 1968), aII'd, 411 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1969).
158. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 668
(1960).
159. A.H. Emery Co. v. Marean Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 16-17 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); R. MILGRlM, supra note 8, § 5.02(2).
160. 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
161. See also Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D.
Md. 1955), aII'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cen. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956); Schulen
burg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cen. denied, 383 U.S. 959
(1966); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493,192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
162. A. TURNER, supra note 29, at 169.
163. 268 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aII'd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cen. denied,
393 U.S. 835 (1968).
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breach of confidence for an employee to reproduce his employer's
drawings from memory as to copy them directly."164 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed, holding "that the information contained in
its parts drawings, which had been reproduced from memory by
[the draftsmen] for the use of the defendants, constituted protect
able [sic] secrets. "165 Similarly, in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 166
the defendants were charged with trade secret misappropriation.
Their defense was that the trade secrets had been copied from
memory. To this defense the court responded:
It may be and if so, it was a remarkable display of memory, for
numerous measurements were in thousandths of an inch. But it
does not matter whether a copy of a Sperry drawing came out in a
defendant's hand or in his head. His duty of fidelity to his em
ployer remains the same. 167

Finally, in Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton,168 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that even though no list or
paper was taken, the former employee would be enjoined from dis
closure if the information which he gained through his employment
and retained in his memory is confidential in nature.
The cases are less uniform, however, when the former em
ployee memorizes and discloses secret customer listS. 169 A number
of jurisdictions17o have adopted the Restatement of Agency test
which prohibits an ex-employee from using or disclosing to com
petitors his ex-employer's "written lists of names [although he
or she is entitled to use] ... names of the customers retained in his
memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent."l71 The
majority of those courts that have squarely faced the issue, how
ever, have rejected the Restatment view that no liability should
be imposed where the customer list in question had been mem
orized. 172 As one court has written: "Whether this information was

164. 268 F. Supp. at 300.
165. 389 F.2d at 15.
166. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
167. Id. at 563.
168. 361 Mass. 835, 840, 282 N.E.2d 921, 924-25 (1972).
169. E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 46, at 156.
170. See, e.g., Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S.W. 834
(1925); E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at 342-43.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958).
172. E.g., American Republic Ins. Co. v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 295 F.
Supp. 553, 555 (D. Or. 1968); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618,
624-25, 136 A.2d 838, 843 (1957).
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embodied in written lists or committed to memory is, we believe, of
no significance; in either case the data are entitled to protection. "173
A third type of acquisition of trade secrets by improper means'
occurs when the appropriation and use of secret information violates
specific terms of a contract.I 74 Many employers, for example, seek
to keep their trade secrets from their competitors by executing em
ployment contracts which contain covenants not to divulge secrets as
well as covenants not to compete after termination of employment.
Such covenants will be enforced so long as they do not unreasonably
restrict the employee's mobility.175 Similarly, firms or individuals
which must communicate trade secrets to parties such as customers,
manufacturers, or suppliers in order to close business deals, often
require the disclosee to contractually promise not to disclose the
information. These contractual provisions are also generally upheld
and enforced. 176
C.

Use of the Wrongfully Acquired Trade Secret

Finally, plaintiff must establish either that the defendant has
used or disclosed the wrongfully acquired trade secret or that there
is a probability of improper disclosure or use to its detriment. 177
Proving this element, as one federal judge has noted, can be "an
173. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 624-25, 136 A.2d
838, 843 (1957) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the merits of the "memory rule"
as applied to customer lists, compare Blake, supra note 158, at 655-57, with Develop
ments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 955-57 (1964); see also
38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324, 343-47 (1963).
174. See generally R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 3.01-.05.
175. See, e.g., Durham v. Stand-by Labor of Georgia, Inc., 230 Ga. 55{3, 198
S.E.2d 145 (1973), noted in 8 GA. L. REV. 527 (1974); Walker Cole and Ice Co. v.
Westerman, 263 Mass. 235, 160 N.E. 801 (1928); 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, at
§ 51.2(c). For an exhaustive collection of pre-1960 cases, see Blake, supra note 158, at
625. For an update of the cases, see 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 29.9-29.26 (1973). Suffice it to say that what constitutes a reasonable
restriction will vary among courts and the circumstances of the case.
176. See, e.g., Compumarketing Servs. Corp. v. Business Envelope Mfrs., 342 F.
Supp. 776 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Sinclair v. Aquarius Elec., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116
Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974); K & G Oil & Servo Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex.
594,314 S.w.2d 782, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
177. Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Hagen, 363 F. Supp.
1325 (w'D.N.Y. 1973); Klein v. Ekco Prods. Co., 135 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.05. One commentator has stated the basis for this
requirement as follows: "In the law of torts there is the maxim: Every dog has one free
bite. A dog cannot be presumed to be vicious until he has proved that he is by biting
someone. As with a dog, the [plaintiff] may have to wait for the [defendant] to commit
some overt act before he can act." R. ELLIS, supra note 29, § 85.
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extraordinarily difficult task"178 since direct evidence is usually very
difficult to obtain.
In most cases plaintiffs must construct a web of perhaps ambigu
ous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw
inferences which convince him that it is more probable than not
that what plaintiffs allege happened did in fact take place. Against
this often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence there fre
quently must be balanced defendants and defendants' witnesses
who directly deny everything. 179

One form of circumstantial evidence that is frequently relied on
to establish use is "similarity. "180 Thus, for example, in a case in
which it is charged that defendant wrongfully acquired and used
plaintiff's secret blueprints for manufacturing a certain product, the
similarity of defendant's product to plaintiff's is sufficient proof that
defendant used plaintiff's trade secret. 181 The theory behind such
a holding is simply that "it is hardly probable that different persons
should independently of each other invent devices so nearly similar
at so nearly the same time. "182 The similarity between the products
need not be identical. Substantial similarity will suffice,183 although
proof of some congruence will not by itself support a finding of
use. 184 The requisite degree of similarity will ordinarily be a ques
tion of fact.
Likewise, evidence that an employee, who has access to his
or her firm's trade secrets, has left the firm and joined a competing
company, and that shortly afterwards that company has begun to
manufacture and sell a product that incorporates these trade se
178. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(Lord, C.J.).
179. Id.
180. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 377 (7th Cir. 1953); Hoeltke v. C. M.
Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir.), cerl. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1935); Greenberg v.
Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974); cf. Kelite Corp. v. Khem
Chems., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 332, 336 (N.D. Ill. 1958) (fonnulae of defendant's products
"close enough" to plaintiff's formulae "to rebut the contention of coincidence or
independent discovery").
181. Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 169 (D. Conn.), mod
ified, 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); Kamin v. Kuhnau,
232 Or. 139, 156,374 P.2d 912, 920-21 (1962).
182. Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 924 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 673 (1935).
183. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971); Riteoff,
Inc. v. Contact Indus., Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 731,350 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1973).
184. See National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966); R. MIL
GRIM, supra note 8, § 7.07(1)(a).
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crets establish the element of use. 185 Thus, in Weil-McLain Co.,
Inc. v. Andro COrp.,186 Andro Corporation charged that Weil-Mc
Lain had wrongfully appropriated its trade secrets. Andro alleged
that it had employed one Dieter Grether as its Manager of En
gineering for several years, and that during this time he had ac
quired knowledge of trade secrets relating to the manufacture of
heating and air conditioning systems. Mter Grether quit and went to
work for Weil-McLain, that company began to manufacture a line of
products identical in many respects to Andro's. The court held that
when a high-level employee with access to a firm's trade secrets is
hired by a competing firm which then markets a product incorporat
ing those secrets, proof of use is present. 187
Regardless of similarity or change of employment by key em
ployees, proof of non-copying or independent development of the
trade secret will bar liability. 188 This defense can be established by
showing that defendant's employees who developed the trade secret
never had access to the allegedly misappropriated information. 189 It
can also be established by proof that experimentation prior to the
hiring of plaintiff's former employee led to the development of the
trade secret. 190
185. Weil-McLain Co. v. Andro Corp., [1976-1977] PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J.
No. 333 at A-16 (BNA) (N.D.N.Y. 1977). Cj. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Ameri
can Potash & Chern. Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 533,200 A.2d 428 (1964); B.F. Goodrich Co.
v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493,192 N.E.2d 99 (1963) (both cases involving threat
of use or disclosure).
186. [1976-77] PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. No. 333 at A-16 (BNA) (N.D.N.Y.
1977).
187. Id. at A-16 and A-17.
188. Speedry Chern. Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 333-34 (2d
Cir. 1962); Crown Indus., Inc. v. Kawneer Co., 335 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1971);
Szczesny v. W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Corp., 20 Ill. App. 3d 607, 614,315
N.E.2d 263, 268 (1974); cj. Teich v. General Mills, Inc., 170 Cal. App. 2d 791, 339
P.2d 627 (1959) (subject matter of appropriation was an idea). See also Whelan, Trade
Secrets-Problems of Acquisition, 18 Bus. LAW. 539, 542 (1963). As to the defendant's
burden of proof in this regard, compare Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912,
923 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1935) (defendant must come forward with
evidence of an independently developed device that is "clear, satisfactory, and
beyond a reasonable doubt") with Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp.
806,815 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (evidence of use of plaintiff's trade secret can be overcome by
a "showing" that the trade secret was developed independently). Cj. Szczesny v.
W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Corp., 20 Ill. App. 3d 607, 315 N.E.2d263 (1974) (on
defendant's motion for summary judgment, defense of independent development will
prevail only upon a showing of compelling proof).
189. Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).
190. ld. See also Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (court recognized defense of prior experimentation but did not believe tes
timony of key defense witness).
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In cases in which the defendant has not used the plaintiff's
trade secret, plaintiff, to obtain an injunction, must show a substan
tial threat of use by the defendant. 191 As with proof of a completed
use or disclosure, this burden of proof can be met by circumstantial
evidence. 192 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth 193 illustrates this
point. Donald Wohlgemuth, while employed by plaintiffB.F. Good
rich worked on the design and construction of certain space suits
for Project Mercury. He quit his job and took a higher paid position
with a competitor of Goodrich, International Latex Corporation,
which had recently been awarded a research and development con
tract for space suits for Project Apollo. Plaintiff sued to enjoin
Wohlgemuth from revealing any of its trade secrets to his new em
ployer. In issuing an injunction, the court observed that there was
"no evidence . . . that Goodrich trade secrets have been revealed
by Wohlgemuth; however, the circumstances surrounding his em
ployment by Latex, and his own attitude as revealed by statements
to fellow Goodrich employees, are sufficient to satisfY this court that
a substantial threat of disclosure exists. "194
When a trade secret is used by one who has acquired it in good
faith without knowledge that the person from whom it was obtained
had acquired the trade secret improperly, liability will not be im
posed. 195 But once the innocent user is put on notice that the trade
secret had been wrongfully obtain.ed, use must cease. 196 The Re

191. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.07(1)(d) (collecting cases). Mere suspicion
that the defendant will use it is not enough. Id.
192. Filter Dynamics Int'!, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 316,
311 N.E.2d 386, 399 (1974).
193. 117 Ohio App. 493,192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
194. Id. at 499, 192 N.E.2d at 104-05.
195. Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th
Cir. 1953),.cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954). See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 758 (1939); R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 5.04(2)(a). While claimed innocent use may
easily be interposed, circumstantial evidence may be introduced in rebuttal. Id.
§ 5.04(2)(c). Such a claim is frequently made by corporations who (1) hire new
employees to acquire their ex-employer's trade secrets, (2) in fact utilize them and
then, when sued by the ex-employer for trade secret misappropriation, argue that they
did not know the employees were breaking a confidential relationship when they
brought such trade secrets with them to their new employer. The cases show that this
defense will rarely succeed. Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp.
557 (D. Md. 1955), afI'd, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956);
Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954); Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1970).
196. Con mar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949); Whiting Milk Co. v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N.E. 379 (1933). See also
R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 5.04(2)(d).
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statement of Torts, it should be noted, takes a more relaxed posi
tion. It would bar liability even after notice if the user is a bona fide
purchaser or "has so changed his position that to subject him to
liability would be inequitable. "197

III.

REMEDIES

Remedies available for the misappropriation of trade secrets
include equitable relief and monetary damages. 19B In appropriate
cases, a court may order both equitable and legal relief.199 Since
misappropriation of trade secrets is an intentional tort, a court has
broad discretion to fashion such relief as will best compensate the
plaintiff for the harm suffered. 20o Every trade secret case thus re
quires a flexible and imaginative approach to the issue of relief.
Counsel for plaintiff should adjust his or her request for relief to ac
cord with the commercial setting of the injury, the likely future
consequences of the misappropriation, and the nature and extent of
defendant's use of the trade secret after the misappropriation.

A.

EqUitable Relief
1.

Injunctions

Injunctive relief to prohibit use of the trade secret as well as
disclosure to others is the remedy most commonly sought in trade
secret cases. 201 As in other contexts, the prerequisites for injunctive
relief are a showing of irreparable harm in the absence of such relief
and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. 202 In most instances, these
197. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 (1939). See also Walters v. Shari Music
Publishing Corp., 185 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), complaint dismissed on jurisdic
tional groullds, 193 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal dismissed conditionally, 298
F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1962).
198. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment e (1939); OPPENHEIM & WES
TON, supra note 8, at 308.
199. Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert.
dellied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956).
200. Telex Corp. V. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 931-33 (10th Cir.), cert. dis
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
201. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 591, 314 S.W.2d 763, 780, cert.
dellied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); National Tile Board Corp. v. Panel board Mfg. Co., 27 N.J.
Super. 348, 355, 99 A.2d 440, 443 (Ch. Div. 1953); E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note
46, at 221; Annot., 170 A.L.R. 449, 488-89 (1942). This is understandable since in most
instances the immediate priority of the party whose trade secret has been misappro
priated will be to enjoin any further use or disclosure of the trade secret. Thus, as a
matter of course, injunctive relief should be sought.
202. American Dirigold Corp. V. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 452 (6th
Cir. 1942); Digital Dev. Corp. v. International Memory Sys., 185 U.S.P.Q. 136 (BNA)
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criteria will be deemed satisfied once it has been established that a
trade secret has been wrongfully acquired. 203
Debate usually centers on the scope rather than the availability
of injunctive relief. The general rule is that an injunction should be
tailored to meet the requirements of the particular case. It should be
neither excessively broad nor unduly restrictive. 204 Accordingly, the
courts will attempt "to put the aggrieved party in trade secret cases
in as good a position as he would have enjoyed had the misappro
priation not occurred. "205
Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
CO.,206 provides a striking illustration of the rule as applied to the
issue of the duration of the injunction. The Mincom Division of the
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (Mincom), had de
veloped an improved precision tape recorder and reproducer. Sub
sequently, Winston Research Corporation (Winston) developed a
similar product. The lower court found that Winston had drawn on
Mincom's trade secrets which it had acquired by hiring several of
that firm's employees. The court enjoined Winston from disclosing
or using Mincom's trade secrets for two years from the date of entry
of the court's judgment. On appeal, Mincom argued that the injunc
tion should have been permanent or at least remained in effect for a
much longer period. Winston, on the other hand, contended that no
injunctive relief was appropriate. The Ninth Circuit rejected both
arguments and affirmed the lower court's order with only slight
modifications. It reasoned that a permanent injunction would sub
vert public policy which encourages technical employees to make
full use of their skill and seeks to foster research and development,
but that denial of relief would reward unfair practices. Thus, a mid
dle ground was appropriate.
By enjoining use of the trade secrets for the approximate period it
would require a legitimate Mincom competitor to develop a suc
cessful machine after public disclosure of the secret information,
(S.D. Cal. 1973). As to the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, see generally
Berryhill, Trade Secret Litigation: Injunctions and Other Equitable Remedies, 48 U.
COLO. L. REV. 189, 201-04 (1976).
203. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888,
958 (1964).
204. Spiseiman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 551, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141,
appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 921, 62 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1946); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7,
131-35 (1969); 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions § 297 (1969); Berryhill, supra note 202,
at 204.
205. Hawkiand, supra note 25, at 130.
206. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
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the district court denied the employees any advantage from their
faithlessness, placed Mincom in the position it would have oc
cupied if the breach of confidence had not occurred prior to the
public disclosure, and imposed the minimum restraint consistent
with the realization of these objectives upon the utilization of the
employees' skills. 207

A number of decisions have employed a similar rationale in issuing

injunctions that are of limited duration. 208
Other courts, however, have not taken such a balanced ap
proach. Thus, in Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 209 the
court held that a defendant may be permanently enjoined from
using a misappropriated trade secret even after it has become pub
lic knowledge and others are thus entitled to use it. The rationale is
that the defendant, having acted wrongfully, should be deprived of
the right now available to everyone else. 210 This view has been
followed in a number of other cases. 211 Conversely, some courts
have held that permanent injunctions may issue but that they shall
automatically end when the trade secret becomes available to the
public. 212
Courts and commentators alike appear to support the position
taken by Winston and its progeny: injunctions in trade secret cases
should remain in effect long enough to remedy the wrong, but no
longer. 213 Since this standard requires the factfinder to determine
how long it would have taken the defendant to duplicate the plain
tifrs process or product, counsel for either party must be prepared
to present evidence on this point. The period of time will, of course,
207. Id. at 142 (footnotes omitted).
208. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1974); Plant Indus.,
Inc. v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
209. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937).
210. Id. at 1l0.
211. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); A. O. Smith Corp. v.
Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.
1935); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 232 Or. 139, 374 P.2d 912 (1962); Elcor Chern. Corp. v.
Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex.
566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
212. Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949) (Hood, J.); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74,
supplemented, 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965). The
Shellmar, supra note 209, and Conmar, supra, doctrines are discussed in A. TURNER,
supra note 49, at 427-28.
213. A. TURNER, supra note 49, at 454; T. ARNOLD, Problems in Trade Secret
Law, 1961-62 ABA PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT SECTION PROCEEDINGS
248,258-60 (1961); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV.
888,958-59 (1964); cases cited in note 208, supra.
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vary depending on the facts of each case. It may be a year or less or,
if the evidence shows that the trade secret could not have been
independently developed, a permanent injunction may issue. 214
Where the misappropriation suit arises out of a breach of a
covenant not to use or disclose an employer's trade secret for a
specified period of time after termination of employment and the
time period specified in the covenant has run prior to the entry of
judgment, the courts are divided as to the availability of injunctive
relief.215 Thus, in Abalene Pest Control Service, Inc. v. Hall,216
plaintiff sued one of its ex-employees to enforce a covenant which
provided that for a period of five years following termination of
employment he would not disclose customer information, and for a
period of two years he would not compete with his employer. By the
time the case was argued in the Vermont Supreme Court, the two
year period had run. Although the court enforced the five year
provisions of the covenant, it dismissed as moot that part of the suit
which sought to enforce the two year provision despite defendant's
continuous violation while the covenant had been in effect. One
commentator has criticized the view that "rights already lost and
wrongs already committed are not remediable by injunction. . . .
[S]uch a rationale ignores the purpose for having these contractual
provisions in the first place, thwarts the compensatory goal of the
injunctive remedy, and foments . . . ineffective litigation in the
form of separate actions for breach of contract. "217 .
On the other hand, when breach of a covenant not to compete
for two years following termination of employment was challenged
in Premier Industrial Corp. v. Texas Industrial Fastener CO.,218 the
court held that the employee could be enjoined from working for a
period of fourteen months from the date of final judgment, even
though the injunction would not end until approximately three years
beyond the date on which the employee quit. This extension was
necessary in order to protect the plaintiff's "right to enjoyment of its
injunctive relief for a meaningful period of time . . . ."219 Other
courts have followed this approach,220 which resembles that taken in

214. See T. Arnold, Rights ill Trade Secrets That Are Not Secret, 1963 S.W.
LEGAL FOUNDATION 1st INST. ON PAT. LAW 135-36.
215. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(l)(a).
216.126 Vt. 1, 220 A.2d 717 (1966).
217. Berryhill, supra note 202, at 207-08 (footnote omitted).
218. 450 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1971).
219. [d. at 448.
220. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 480 F.2d
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Winston in its attempt to frame a balanced injunctive decree which
truly seeks to make the plaintiff whole.
Another interesting question that has arisen about the scope of
injunctive relief is whether a court can enjoin the defendant from
continuing to engage in the same line of business in competition
with plaintiff after misappropriation of a trade secret has been
proved. The answer appears to be "no." While there can be no
doubt that a court will enjoin the defendant from manufacturing a
product which embodies the trade secret or is produced by using
it,221 the courts will not on the basis of misappropriation alone pro
hibit the defendant from continuing in that business. 222 He or she is
to produce the product using other methods or processes. This re
sult recognized that "[t]he injunctive relief should be restricted to
the benefits flowing from the ... [improper acquisition]. "223
In sum, the case law recognizes that injunctive relief in trade
secret cases is not guided by rigid rules. To the contrary, the formu
lation of injunctive relief will turn in most cases upon a full consider
ation of all the surrounding circumstances, guided by the consider
ation that relief must be tailored to accomplish remedial and not
criminal purposes.
2.

Other Equitable Relief

Additional equitable remedies which the courts have decreed
include an order for the return of the trade secret and copies thereof
when physically feasible,224 and destruction of the products man
ufactured through the use of the trade secret along with the equip
ment used by the defendant in the manufacturing process. 225 The
scope of such relief also turns upon the circumstances of each case.
223 (1st CiT. 1973); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 352, 226 N.E.2d 624
(1967); cf. Sanitary Fann Dairies, Inc. v. Wolf, 261 Minn. 166, 112 N.W.2d 42 (1961)
(plaintiff entitled to injunction for length of time sufficient to allow him to compete on
even tenns with ex-employee who solicited customers while still in plaintiff's
employ).
221. Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958); R. MIL
GRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(I)(b) (collecting cases); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 572 (1971) (col
lecting cases).
222. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); R. MILGRIM, supra note
8, § 7.08(1)(b).
223. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 378 (7th CiT. 1953).
224. General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 50 Misc. 2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600,
modified, 52 Misc. 2d 197,274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Standard Steel Car Co., 219 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904); R. MILGRIM, supra note 8,
§ 7.08(4)(a).
225. General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Frantz, 50 Misc. 2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600,

1978]

TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION

39

For example, destruction of all equipment will usually be decreed
when the defendant may continue to use the trade secret or sell the
product embodying it despite the existence of an injunction.
Likewise, an order for the destruction of equipment may issue when
it appears that defendant may flee the jurisdiction. ~26 Destruction
will not be decreed, however, when the equipment is usable in
other manufacturing activities. 227

B.

Monetary Damages
1.

Compensatory Damages

It is clear that compensatory damages may be awarded in trade
secret misappropriation cases. 228 The two basic measures of recov
ery include the losses sustained by plaintiff and the profits earned by
defendant through the use of the misappropriated trade secret. 229 In
most instances, plaintiff may recover under either theory, but not
both,' for otherwise there would be a double recovery.230 However,
recovery under both theories is not precluded when the circum
stances so require it to make the plaintiff whole. 231 Regardless of the
method employed, plaintiff has the burden of proving damages. 232
Damages must be more than merely speculative, although mathe

modified, 52 Misc. 2d 197, 274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Contra, American Bell
Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 F. 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
226. See Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HARV. L. REV. 976, 982
(1951); Comment, 35 MICH. L. REv. 1350 (1937).
227. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 378 (7th Cir. 1953).
228. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th
Cir. 1974); Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
denied, 270 App. Div. 921, 62 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1946).
229. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). See also 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 29, § 59.3; R.
ELLIS, supra 29, § 287; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 746, 747 (1938). The first
method is commonly referred to as the traditional common law remedy, and the sec
ond as an equitable remedy which treats the defendant as trustee ex maleficio for the
victim of the wrongdoer's gains from his wrongdoing. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O,
Inc., 447 F.2d at 1392.
230. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Consolidated Boiler Corp. v. Bogue Elec. Co., 141 N.J.
Eq. 550,58 A.2d 759 (1948); R. ELLIS, supra note 29, § 287.
231. Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1975); Telex Corp. v.
I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Clark v.
Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).
232. R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(3)(c). Plaintiff must, of course, establish
that the damages he seeks to recover are a direct result of the defendant's misappro
priation. See Runiks v. Peterson, 155 Colo. 47,392 P.2d 590 (1964).
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matical precision is not necessary.233 A rational evidentiary basis
for a given damage claim will usually suffice. 234 .
a.

Losses Sustained

The most obvious example of losses sustained by a plaintiff is
profits lost as a result of the misappropriation. For example, the
defendant's misappropriation of the trade secret may have enabled it
to displace plaintiff's product in the market sooner than would
otherwise have been the case. As a consequence, plaintiff may have
sold fewer products and suffered a loss of profits. In such a case,
damages may be calculated on the basis of those lost profits.235 If the
misappropriation precludes the plaintiff from manufacturing or mar
keting its product, the same reasoning should similarly support the
recovery of lost profits. In this context, the net profits generally
recoverable are computed by subtracting any costs which have been
avoided from lost revenues. 236 This measure, however, does include
certain fixed overhead costS.237
Plaintiff's recovery is not limited to lost profits. The cases indi
cate that costs incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the misappro
priation are also recoverable. 238 Thus, if the misappropriation has
led to increased manufacturing costs or added training expenses for
personnel, the total amount of such expenditures can be recov
ered. 239
233. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Morton v. Rogers, 20 Ariz. App. 581, 586, 514 P.2d 752, 757
(1973).
234. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th
Cir. 1974); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Sigma Sys. Corp., 500 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
235. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 931 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Kamin v. Kuhnau,
232 Or. 139, 157,374 P.2d 912, 921 (1962). Plaintiff's loss of profits may also include
the profits he or she could reasonably have expected from follow-up sales of spares or
parts to supplement the basic product. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d
1387 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
..
236. See generally Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedure in Unfair Com
petition Cases, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 431 (1946); 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 336 (1956).
237. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 748, Comment i (1938); Sperry Rand Corp. v.
A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1394 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S: 1017 (1972);
Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 400-03 (D. Md. 1963);
American Elecs., Inc. v. Neptune Meter Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 117, 290N.Y.S.2d 333
(1968).
238. See Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir.), cert. dis
missed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
239. D. BOIES, DAMAGES FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS 231
( 1975).
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Defendant's Gain

When plaintiff is unable to prove specific injury, the appro
priate measure of damages is the benefits, profits, or advantages
gained by the defendant in the use of the misappropriated trade
secret. 240 The cases reveal many variations in the way this benefit to
the defendant can be computed. Counsel should consider each
standard and then determine which is best suited to his client's case.
The first method is to measure the defendant's profits attribut
able to its use of the trade secret. 241 In most instances only the
defendant's actual profits can be considered; speculations and esti
mates must be excluded. 242 Plaintiff is only entitled to net profits;
the defendant may deduct the expenses that relate to the new prod
uct despite the use of plaintiff's trade secret. Deduction for recur
ring general and administrative expenses, however, is not al
lowed. 243
When no actual profits exist or their determination is impracti
cal, another method referred to as the "reasonable royalty;' may be
used for purposes of assessing damages. 244 A reasonable royalty is
that amount which the trier of fact estimates that a party would be
willing to pay for use of the trade secret and the owner would be
willing to accept.245 In calculating what a fair licensing price would
240. International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d
Cir. 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate
Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Md. 1963).
241. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536
(5th Cir. 1974). Generally, a judicial accounting is ordered to determine the amount of
profits. Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1433, 1437-38 (1959).
242. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940);
Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1433, 1437-38 (1959).
243. See Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540, 553-54 (Mo. 1970); Annot., 63
A.L.R.2d 1433 (1959).
244. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518,
536-42 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing cases); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621,
627 (7th Cir. 1971). The rationale for resort to another standard when profits cannot be
determined was aptly described in Lykes-Youngstown, as follows:
[T]he risk of defendants' venture, using the misappropriated secret, should
not be placed on the injured plaintiff, but rather the defendants must bear the
risk of failure themselves. Accordingly the law looks to the time at which the
misappropriation occurred to determine what the value of the misappro
priated secret would be to a defendant who believes he can utilize it to his
advantage, provided he does in fact put the idea to a commercial use.
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d at 536 (footnote
omitted).
245. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536
38 (5th Cir. 1974). For discussion of the reasonable royalty standard in patent infringe
ment cases, which is used by analogy in trade secret cases, see Foster v. American
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have been had the parties agreed, the factfinder should consider
such variables as foreseeable changes in the parties' competitive
positions; the price past purchasers or licensees may have paid; the
total value of the secret to the plaintiff, including the plaintiff's
development costs and the importance of the secret to the plaintiffs
business; the nature and extent of the use the defendant intended
for the secret; and whatever other unique factors in the particular
case, such as the ready availability of alternative processes, may
have affected the parties' agreement. 246 That the plaintiff had in the
past refused to license the trade secret, and thus is unable to intro
duce past transactions as evidence of the terms of a reasonable
license agreement, does not preclude' the use of this standard. 247
A third approach to the determination of defendant's cost sav
ings as a result of the misappropriation is frequently called the
'~standard of comparison test. "248 This standard "contemplates a
comparison of the costs incurred by the defendant using the . . .
trade secret, and the costs that would have been incurred had he not
used the trade secret. The difference between the two is thE: 'bene
fit' accruing to the defendant, and is the measure of plaintiff; s dam
ages. "249
Using the defendant's gain as the measure of damages is a most
significant standard since it can be computed in various ways. Coun
sel should not overlook the possibilities it affords for making the
plaintiff whole.

Machine & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974);
Hughes Tool Co. v. C. W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 491 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1973); Note,
Recovery ill Patellt Illfringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 848-49 (1960); Fink,
The New Measure of Damages ill Patellt Cases, 29 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 822 (1947);
Wolff, The Measure of Damages ill Patellt Illfrillgemellt Actiolls Ullder the Act of
August 1,1946,28 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 877 (1946).
246. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518,
538-39 (5th Cir. 1974).
247. ld. at 542-43.
248. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975); International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d
696,699 (3d Cir. 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958).
249. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975). At least one court has considered the plaintiff's actual develop
ment costs as the measure of damages under this standard. The court, however, noted
that such measurement would be inadequate in most instances because it would not
take into account the commercial context in which the misappropriation occurred.
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 538 (5th Cir.
1974).
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Punitive Damages

Although punitive damages are not generally favored by the
law,250 recent trade secret decisions have allowed them in appro
priate cases. 251 This trend has become so marked that one commen
tator has observed that "[i]f your goal in business tort litigation is to
obtain a maximum recovery for your client, you will fall short of that
objective if you overlook the possibility of collecting punitive dam
ages."252
While the law controlling when punitive damages will be im
posed varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most courts will assess
three fundamental factors: The character of the defendant's conduct,
the extent and nature of the harm to the plaintiff caused or intended
by the defendant, and the wealth of the defendant. 253 Expressed
another way, the courts look to see whether the defendant's conduct
is "flagran t. "254

3.

Attorney's Fees as Damages

The cases differ on the question of whether a successful plaintiff
may recover attorney's fees. 255 Although some courts have noted the
general policy of both state and federal courts not to award such fees
in the absence of an agreement or statutory authorization,256 others
will nevertheless make such an award. 257 Accordingly, counsel
should investigate whether the state where suit is brought permits
recovery of attorney's fees to a successful plain tiff.

250. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958).
251. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Sperry Rand Corp.
v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Carter
Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md. 1963); Southern Cal.
Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960).
252. Galane, Provillg PUllitive Damages ill Busilless Tort Litigatioll, LITIGA
TION, Spring 1976 at 24.
253. Id. The Galane article is highly recommended because of its thorough dis
cussion of all aspects of punitive damages.
254. Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 933 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975).
255. See R. MILGRIM, supra note 8, § 7.08(3)(e) (collecting cases).
256. Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp., 502 F.2d 802
(9th Cir. 1974); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
257. Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md.
1963); Irving Iron Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 702, 126 A. 291
(1924).
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CONCLUSION

Protecting trade secrets has assumed considerable importance
in today's corporate· world. Cognizant of the role that confidential
business information plays in the competitive market, businesses are
making substantial investments of time and money to guard against
the loss of such information. Nevertheless, despite the most strin
gent internal security programs, misappropriation does occur. When
this happens, the injured firm must turn to the courts for relief.
This article attempts to provide guidelines for the practitioner
who is unfamiliar with the subject of trade secret misappropriation.
A careful and informed approach is necessary to litigation in this
area. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he lawyer cannot and
should not regard a trade secret problem as just another tort
case. "258 Such litigation presents a host of challenging problems
regarding the elements of liability that must be established together
with the proof that will satisfY such elements.
Though no one particular theory of liability for trade secret
.misappropriation has evolved in American legal thought, proof of
three elements is essential to establish liability. First, plaintiff must
show the existence of a trade secret. This requires proof that: (1) The
trade secret is protectible subject matter; (2) it is not common
knowledge throughout the trade; (3) efforts have been made to main
tain secrecy; and (4) it is of.some value to plaintiff. Second, it must
be shown that a third party acquired the secret by improper conduct
or unfair means. Third, that use or disclosure of the trade secret by
that party will be to the owner's detriment must be shown.
Although not essential to establishing liability, the form of relief
should be thoroughly examined by counsel. The commercial setting
of the injury, the probable future consequences of the misappropria
tion, and the nature and extent of defendant's use of the trade secret
must be assessed when drafting a request for relief which will best
compensate plaintiff for the injury.
While many of the practical problems that arise have been dis
cussed, it is evident that others remain. In attempting to resolve
these problems, the attorney should consider the four competing
interests and demands that have shaped trade secret misappropria
tion law. They are:
(1) The interests, demands and claims of an enterprise which by
costly research and experiment has developed information, inven

258.

Berryhill, supra note 202, at 189.
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tions, skills and knowledge, e.g., know-how, that gives to such
enterprises an advantageous competitive position in the market
place. This is a valuable business asset for the acquisition of which
other enterprises are willing to pay a price and the unauthorized
disclosure or misuse by others would inflict a serious damage to
the originating enterprise.
(2) The interests, demands and claims of competing enterprises
which desire to obtain the benefit of know-how developed by
others as an effective instrument for the promotion of their inter
ests. They are looking out for the publication of any information
on such know-how and desire to enter into agreements to obtain
communication of know-how maintained in secrecy.
(3) The interests and claims of the community in the widest
possible intercommunication of know-how by enterprises and the
resulting high quality standards and low cost of goods, and in the
avoidance of undue or excessive restraints between those compet
ing in the market place.
(4) The interests of the social and legal order of the country
concerned which would be fatally injured if the spirit of invention
and creation and the investment in research and development of
know-how was to be discouraged, and if it would be permitted to
enterprises to engage in unlawful competition and unauthorized
use of secret know-how of others, or in the disinclination to share
technical knowledge and skills. 259

Although they will not provide the attorney with conclusive an
swers, analyzing a specific problem in light of these interests will at
least indicate the approach that a court might deem the most equita
ble under the circumstances. This will enable the practitioner to
better determine the likelihood of success when presented with a
potential trade secret misappropriation case.
259.
(1964).

Ladas, Legal Protectioll of Kllow-How, 54
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